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ABSTRACT. Historians have tended to characterize the ‘white ethnic’ identity politics 
of the 1970s in the United States as a significant feature of the conservative 
counterrevolution, especially the rise of populist racial conservatism and its splintering of 
the Democratic New Deal coalition. Seeking to provide a broader, more representative 
portrait of white ethnic mobilization, activism, and institutionalization in government, 
with particular focus on the work of Rev. Geno Baroni, the National Center for Urban 
Ethnic Affairs, and the Carter administration’s Office of Ethnic Affairs, this article 
challenges that assumption. It posits that the politics of white ethnicity was a far more 
complex, diverse phenomenon, of appeal to liberals and conservatives in an era of 
considerable political flux. This reconsideration also reveals that the 1970s were not 
conservative in the United States, but a watershed decade of uncertainty, volatility, and 
experimentation, in which ethnic identities and affiliations were reshaped, political norms 
upended, and new forms of organization and mobilization trialled out, with great 
significance for today’s ‘post-ethnic’ United States. White ethnic politics was of 
considerable importance to American political development in the late twentieth century, 
but not in the way usually thought. 
 
 
 
Standing in the Roosevelt Room of the White House in April 1977, the stocky Catholic 
priest tugged at his white collar and smiled nervously. He had been sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for Neighborhoods at the Department of Housing & Urban Development 
(HUD), serving under the new Democratic president, Jimmy Carter. The priest’s proud 
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immigrant parents stood to his right; Vice President Walter Mondale, presiding, to his 
left. Above this avowedly ‘ethnic’ Italian-American priest  hung a portrait of President 
Theodore Roosevelt, who only sixty years earlier had warned of the ‘menace’ posed by 
hyphenated Americans, demanding ‘100 percent Americanism’. 
For the Rev. Geno Baroni, this was the culmination of a decade’s work as a 
national advocate for the ‘white ethnics’ – the mainly working-class descendants of 
Southern and Eastern European immigrants. In contrast to Roosevelt, he encouraged 
these groups to reject assimilation and assert a new ‘white ethnic’ identity, analogous to 
racial minorities, emphasising themes of ethnic disadvantage, discrimination, and group 
difference to gain material and psychological reward. Rather than organize ethnic whites 
along individual national-group lines, Baroni sought to build a unified, multiethnic 
political culture and identity under this new label that would transcend differences of 
language, religion and national origin. Observers anticipated that Baroni’s appointment 
marked the beginning of a concerted federal effort to address a white ethnic agenda 
similar to that of its black or Hispanic antecedents.1 
What exactly constituted this white ethnic agenda was not always clear or 
consistent. Whereas some advocates thought in terms of socio-economic disadvantage, 
hypothesising the white ethnics as an underprivileged, needy minority group, others 
focused on cultural concerns, addressing a perceived sense of cultural inferiority, even 
discrimination. Both spoke to a lingering sense of ethnic anxiety, unease, and 
disillusionment with traditional political and cultural norms at the beginning of the 1970s. 
The result was an unwieldy, sometimes contradictory agenda which reflected the 
diversity of the white ethnic constituency, and also hinted at potential obstacles to group 
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cohesion and future policy breakthroughs for their number, but which also reflected a 
transformed post-civil rights political environment in which group identities, rights 
claims and mobilization were crucial, and the volatile and uncertain tenor of the times. 
Baroni recognized the necessity of responding to this political shift. A Catholic 
minister in the Pennsylvania coalfields and then Washington D.C., Baroni had worked for 
anti-poverty and civil rights causes before being appointed in 1966 to head a Catholic 
church task force on urban problems, through which he became acquainted with the 
difficulties facing working-class whites. Four years later, Baroni came to national 
attention after using the Catholic Bishops’ Labor Day statement to reject the ‘widespread 
accusation [urban ethnics are]… the primary exponents of racism in our society’, instead 
citing the neglect and poverty they faced. Baroni urged the inclusion of ethnic whites 
alongside racial minorities in programmes designed to address the urban crisis, 
alleviating what he saw as an alarming trend towards group conflict and polarization:  
 
Little attention has been given to the anguish of the... ethnic “forgotten” 
American… there is a desperate need to reduce and prevent the confrontation… 
between the white urban ethnic groups and the minority poor… We must go 
beyond the civil rights struggle of the 60s… We must bring together a new 
coalition… the blacks, the Appalachians, the Indians, the Spanish-speaking, and 
the white urban ethnic groups… then we can develop a true cultural pluralism in 
this country and reduce… group conflict.2 
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Calling for a ‘new urban populism’ that would bring ‘urban ethnics’ together with 
racial minorities on issues of mutual interest, he sought to alleviate racial tensions and 
restore the liberal coalition. He looked to black Americans as a role model, not as a rival, 
adopting their techniques and vocabulary. ‘Those of us in the ethnic bag’, he confessed, 
‘can learn from the blacks about the importance of cultural identity.’3 By emphasizing 
ethnicity over race, class or national origin, Baroni offered a new means of reaching out 
to disaffected working-class whites who felt they had been left behind by the pace of 
liberal social change during the 1960s, and his influence grew. A six-page interview in 
the Washington Post in 1969 asked, ‘Is he [Baroni] one of the few relevant white men in 
this city?’4 
In the political world of the 1970s, Baroni was extremely successful in 
articulating a variety of competing white ethnic concerns. The expansion of federal social 
policies would ease the socio-economic disadvantages felt by white ethnic Americans. 
Neighbourhood revitalization programmes for ethnic communities, he declared, would 
rejuvenate the blighted urban areas in which they lived. Ethnic studies courses would 
alleviate ethnics’ cultural inferiority and breed group understanding. Affirmative action 
and quotas would correct the discrimination long faced by ethnic Americans. Each was 
instituted by local, state and federal governments during the 1970s. Baroni’s National 
Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs (NCUEA) secured funding from organizations ranging 
from the Ford Foundation and the US Catholic Conference to the White House. His 
conferences on white ethnic issues attracted high-profile press coverage and academics, 
community leaders and politicians with national ambitions. Baroni’s prominence in 
public affairs gave the impression of a movement on the rise. 
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Baroni was also a regular visitor to the White House. In the summer of 1970, he 
met with President Nixon, who underscored his support for the new affirmation of white 
ethnicity and his sensitivity to ethnics’ social problems.5 In 1976, Baroni returned to the 
White House to broker four conferences, with the new White House Office of Ethnic 
Affairs, on ethnicity and public policy. And in that year’s presidential election, Baroni 
was a senior adviser to Carter’s Democratic campaign. His reward for his work – which 
Carter aides acknowledged ‘turned us around with the Catholic voters’ – was his HUD 
appointment.6   
Despite the potential contradictions of the ‘white ethnic’ agenda, Baroni’s efforts 
initially worked well in the transformed post-civil rights political environment of the 
1970s. And Baroni was by no means a lone voice in developing a more temperate white 
ethnic politics. This cadre called for urban reinvestment and community activism, the 
expansion rather than the retrenchment of the Great Society reforms of the 1960s, and 
racial cooperation rather than backlash. They laid claim to new federal programmes, 
funds, rights and entitlements for minority groups. They developed new models of 
multiculturalism and Americanism, looked to rejuvenate liberalism, and sought to build 
multiracial coalitions. Such a politics was far removed from images of anti-busing 
protesters in Boston, hard-hats in New York City, or stone-throwing mobs in Cicero, 
Illinois; the traditional symbols of white ethnic politics. Instead, Barbara Mikulski of 
Baltimore, Stephen Adubato of Newark, Baroni: these were the real faces of ‘Ethnic 
Power’, as Newsweek dubbed it in 1970, ‘the newest rallying cry in American politics’.7  
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I 
This evidence is largely absent from historical narratives of the white ethnics. Instead, the 
white ethnic upsurge of the 1970s is often viewed through one of two rather limiting 
lenses. On the one hand, some have written of an ethnic ‘revival’ or ‘reawakening’, an 
era in which the cultural manifestations of white, European ethnicity reasserted 
themselves.8 From Hollywood films to novelty license plates, national cuisine to its 
favourite TV shows, American culture discredited assimilatory, melting pot ideals in 
favour of the assertion of ethnicity during the 1970s. This was the era of Roots, The 
Godfather and the Prince Spaghetti commercials, ‘It’s Great to be Greek’ buttons and 
‘Visit Your Homeland’ tour packages – commodified, almost trivialized interpretations 
of ethnicity.  
On the other, many works touching on white ethnic politics have focused on 
images of angry, marginalized whites, resentful of the socio-economic progress of blacks 
and the establishment liberals who championed their cause. The words of the National 
Confederation of American Ethnic Groups’ Paul Deac sound a familiar refrain in the 
historiography on white ethnicity: ‘We spend millions and the Negroes get everything 
and we get nothing.’9 
So why are the more progressive, substantive manifestations of white ethnic 
politics – equally, if not more prominent during the period – overlooked in favour of 
images of ‘Kiss Me I’m Italian’ buttons or resentful whites? Historians have moved 
towards a more nuanced appreciation of the African-American and Chicano rights 
movements of the second half of the twentieth century, underlining the many cleavages, 
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interests, and divisions within each community. Why have they not done likewise for the 
white ethnics? 
The answer may lie in the tendency in the literature to render the white ethnic 
upsurge inseparable from the rise of populist racial conservatism during the 1970s. In this 
interpretation, these angry ethnics were the harbinger of a conservative backlash against 
Democratic liberalism in the urban north, ‘reactionary populists’ who broke from their 
Democratic moorings to vote for George Wallace, protested school busing and 
affirmative action, and formed the vanguard of Nixon’s ‘Silent Majority’. They were the 
prototypical Reagan Democrats – the working and middle-class whites who deserted the 
party of Roosevelt for the party of Reagan. Their affirmation of their ethnicity and 
defence of old neighbourhoods and traditions served only as a politically palatable Trojan 
horse for what sociologist Orlando Patterson described as ‘covert anti-black political 
action’, a means of perpetuating white racial primacy in the urban north in response to 
black migration, the civil rights movement and the legislation that responded to it.10  
Consequently, scholars have established – and continue to reinforce – a causal 
link between the politics of white ethnicity and the rise of racial conservatism in the 
collapse of the New Deal coalition. Mary Waters accuses the ethnic politics of the 1970s 
of ‘fanning the flames of racial division’, much to conservatives’ long-term gain. 
Matthew Jacobson has tied together ‘ethnic reverie’ and ‘conservative rebirth’, 
demonstrating how conservatives co-opted the rhetorical symbols and motifs of the 
politics of white ethnicity – so-called ‘ethnic values’ of self-reliance and hard work – to 
assail racially redistributive public policies. Robert Mason has identified the white 
ethnics as a core constituency of Richard Nixon’s ‘New Majority’ project; their votes 
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pursued, and secured, through an ‘opposition to racial liberalism’. Finally, John Skrentny 
and Thomas Sugrue have revealed how conservatives constructed a ‘smashingly 
successful’ political majority through engagement with the politics of white ethnicity. For 
Sugrue and Skrentny, the white ethnics were ‘the embodiment of Nixon’s Silent 
Majority… alienated by the civil rights movement, betrayed by liberals, and simmering 
with “middle-class rage”’. Their analysis of Nixon’s divisive politics of ethnic 
ressentiment even forms a chapter in an edited collection entitled Rightward bound: 
making America conservative in the 1970s.11 
But have we got this wrong? If white ethnic politics was an expression of white 
racial privilege and conservatism, as so many scholars suggest, why did ethnic groups 
rediscover their minority status and identity during the 1970s? Why did they resurrect 
earlier, pejorative, images of themselves as ‘not quite white’, and build coalitions with 
minority groups rather than whites?12 In our focus on the more visceral, extreme 
expressions of white ethnicity, or our desire to look for linear trends and clearly-defined 
meanings in this political moment, have we overlooked the manifestations of white ethnic 
political activity that were neither reactionary or racially conservative? Was there a 
liberal alternative wrapped up in the white ethnic politics of the 1970s?13  
This article will argue that we should reconsider what we know about the politics 
of white ethnicity, and what we consider to be its broader significance. By overlooking 
the work of Baroni et al in favour of themes of conservative resistance and racial 
populism, historians have failed to appreciate the complexity of the politics of white 
ethnicity and left us unenlightened as to the influence it held over progressive politics 
during the 1970s. Not only that, but they have overstated its importance to political 
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change in the latter part of the twentieth century. The story of the white ethnic political 
activism of the 1970s does not fit easily into a teleological liberal-conservative narrative, 
but is deeply contested and diverse. White ethnicity was of appeal to actors of all stripes, 
and each used it as a means to build new political coalitions and new visions of national 
identity and community. By working towards a fuller understanding of both the content 
and the impulses behind white ethnic activism, shaped more by the breakthroughs of the 
civil rights movements of the 1960s than any nascent conservatism, we can realize the 
extent of its influence over political development during the 1970s, and probe the wider 
meaning of this volatile chapter in American political life.  
 
II 
‘[A] revolution is taking place in white working-class communities of Northeastern and 
Midwestern Urban America’, an aide to New York mayor John Lindsay observed upon 
attending an NCUEA conference in June 1971. ‘The Melting Pot myth is dead and 
buried… alienation, frustration, lack of identity and lack of upward mobility have forced 
them to the wall. They are now ready to fight for power.’14 The aide was responding to 
the political mobilization of European ethnic groups from across the industrial northeast 
and midwest. Activists and community organizers responded to the transformed 
exogenous environment of the late 1960s and early 1970s and developed a network of 
national and grassroots organizations to push white ethnic group interests in local politics 
and on the national stage. ‘White, middle America ethnics will set the agenda for the 
1970s’, one activist proclaimed in 1972. ‘We are all ethnics now’, concluded the Italo-
American Times in the same year.15  
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The emergence of this world of white ethnic mobilization, assertion, and activism 
was unexpected. In the two decades following the Second World War, white ethnic 
identities had appeared largely superfluous to national political life, transcended by the 
myth of the American melting pot, a faith in upward mobility and a sense of political 
consensus, even conformity. Sociologists concluded that identities of race and religion 
had subsumed those of ethnicity and national origin, and national politics was no 
exception. ‘Appeals centred on… the ethnic melting pot’, political scientist Walter Dean 
Burnham declared in the early 1960s, ‘[are] almost as archaic as appeals to Civil War 
loyalties.’16 
However, the reassertion of ethnic identity reflected the transformed political 
environment of the late 1960s and 1970s United States. The liberal consensus and its 
values of assimilation, universalism, and individual rights and opportunity had imploded. 
Liberalism’s attentiveness towards racial minorities, asking the white working and 
middle-class to bear the cost of programmes of relief and redress for these groups in an 
inflationary economy, stoked ethnic anger, alienation and a fear of being forgotten. 
However, these feelings did not necessarily translate themselves into racial backlash. 
Instead, electoral turnout plummeted in ethnic wards, and Polish-Americans and Italian-
Americans rated highly for feelings of fear, anomie, and alienation.17 Such an uncertain 
environment left behind a political vacuum that defined the new epoch, providing the 
space in which white ethnic organizations and institutions could mobilize and evolve.  
This sense of vacuum was further underlined by the decline of traditional political 
institutions or means of coalition-building, such as the urban Democratic machines, and 
the eclipse of an old distributional politics of economic need by new ethno-cultural 
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concerns such as race, crime, and morality.18 In ethnic communities fraternal orders and 
parish organizations were increasingly anachronistic institutions.19 White ethnic activists 
and organizations sought to fill the void. In 1974, Baroni observed that, ‘[the] 
organizations traditionally serving these communities – the Catholic church, the unions, 
the Democratic Party – have lost their ability… to address the real needs of these 
communities’, and emphasized the role the NCUEA could play in replacing them.20  
Meanwhile, the staggering impact of the Black Power template encouraged many 
groups to seek recognition and recompense in a polity increasingly conscious of group 
rights. Whilst ethnic defensiveness and resentment towards Black Power was 
undoubtedly a trigger for the new politics of white ethnicity, it also acted, paradoxically, 
as an inspiration to many ethnic activists. Blacks’ success in securing community control 
of services, electing political candidates and building respect for their cultural identity 
made their model an alluring one, demonstrating how group identities could be used as a 
means of political mobilization and securing rewards from government.   
Perhaps most important in the crystallization of white ethnic group assertion was 
a new politics of group rights and compensatory justice – what John Skrentny has dubbed 
‘the minority rights revolution’ – which emerged in the wake of the black political protest 
of the 1960s.21 Previously, civil rights advocacy organizations such as the NAACP, G.I. 
Forum, and LULAC had pursued their goals by emphasising themes of integration, 
citizenship and above all their fundamental similarity to the American majority (even, in 
some cases, their whiteness). Once these ends were reached, it was assumed that ethno-
racial labels and distinctions would disappear.22  
JOE MERTON 
However, by the 1970s the rules had changed. Writing in 1969, political scientist 
Theodore Lowi observed that public policy had become about ‘indemnifying damages 
rather than righting wrongs’.23 Ethnic and racial groups – now formal ‘minorities’ – 
formulated critiques of American society that emphasized disadvantage, discrimination 
and above all difference. Federal policies, from bilingual education to affirmative action, 
catered to assertions of victimhood and minority rights and divided the nation into ethno-
racial categories. White ethnic groups, following the black template, recognized the value 
of the ethnic group as a vehicle for asserting such claims. ‘The Italian-American 
community has to make its move’, the Italian newspaper Fra Noi explained in 1976. ‘In a 
pluralistic society where many groups are grasping for public attention, public money and 
public approbation, the group which is most organized… has the best chance of capturing 
a legitimate voice in the making of public policy.’ ‘The Italian community is learning a 
lesson the black community learned long ago,’ civil rights veteran Bayard Rustin 
observed admiringly. ‘It is the squeaky wheel that gets greased.’24  
The white ethnics did have genuine social and economic needs, and for some 
white ethnic mobilization was a necessary response to those needs. A study of Chicago’s 
ethnic communities revealed that 83 per cent had no high school education and 65 per 
cent earned less than $10,000 per year.25 However, unable to adapt their claims of 
economic disadvantage to the ethno-racial  imperatives of anti-discrimination policy 
established by the minority rights revolution, ethnic activists now asserted a ‘white 
ethnic’ identity and status almost analogous to racial minorities as a means of getting 
ahead. ‘People are having real problems making it’, one activist acknowledged in 1970. 
‘Some do have an ethnic vision of themselves… that’s one channel through which they 
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can organize to help themselves.’26 This reassertion of white ethnic consciousness and 
group difference was thus not simply motivated by a fear of being left behind by 
organized racial minorities in the battle for scarce federal resources, but also a pragmatic 
response to the changing rules of the game in the American polity of the 1970s. 
Other actors sensitized to the new white ethnic politics also responded to the 
concerns of the new era. Visions of a providential, unified national culture or community 
were questioned in the wake of liberalism’s collapse, and white ethnic politics was a 
similar response. Many activists lamented a coercive immigrant experience – even 
analogising it to slavery – which had robbed ethnic Americans of their identity, culture, 
and heritage, and sought to use such a narrative as a means of building a shared sense of 
historical experience and solidarity amongst European ethnic groups. Baroni feared his 
Italian-American nephews and nieces would ‘grow up like Wonder Bread – no crust, no 
identity’; Michael Novak, the leading intellectual voice in the white ethnic movement, 
argued that the white ethnics lacked the WASP ‘sense of proprietorship about basic 
American symbols’ or black students’ knowledge that “black is beautiful”’, instead 
facing ‘cultural deprivation all along the line’.27 Others saw the resurgence of ethnicity as 
offering a new vision of national identity and community defined by group difference and 
diversity rather than universalism, filling the cultural space vacated by liberalism. In 
doing so, they formulated a model of multiculturalism, albeit mainly white and European, 
in which ethnic pluralism became an integral part of Americanism. This vision was 
reflected in the ethnic studies legislation passed by Congress in 1972 and the 
Bicentennial celebrations of 1976.  
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Community organizations organized along pan-ethnic lines, replicating 
developments in black communities, also responded to the new environment. Whilst 
fraternal organizations for individual ethnic groups such as the Polish-American 
Congress and Sons of Italy had long existed, much of the white ethnic activism of the 
1970s was defined by its attempts at multiethnic political mobilization. Democratic 
Senator Barbara Mikulski cut her political teeth organising the South East Community 
Organization (SECO) in ethnic Baltimore, where she led the fight against discriminatory 
disinvestment and ‘redlining’ in urban communities and developed NCUEA chapters for 
working-class ethnic women. Mikulski called for a ‘new Agenda for America’, built on 
an alliance between ‘forgotten and forlorn’ ethnic Americans and racial minorities ‘based 
on mutual issues, interdependence and respect’. In Gary, Indiana, working-class ethnics 
united to form the Calumet Community Congress. The CCC featured in Newsweek and 
drew the attention of Senators Muskie and Kennedy, both of whom spoke out in praise of 
its pre-emption of racial conflict in the city and its pursuit of social and political reform. 
Both SECO and the CCC would secure six-figure grants for their work from the Ford 
Foundation and the federal government.28 In New York City, white ethnic activists 
transcended ethnic boundaries to establish the New York Center for Ethnic Affairs, with 
support from the Office of Economic Opportunity, Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s State 
Division of Human Rights and a liberal city mayor, John Lindsay, keen to re-establish 
links with white ethnic communities and broaden the scope of anti-poverty projects. In its 
mission statement, the Center pledged, ‘to lay the groundwork for cooperative efforts 
between New York’s ethnic and minority populations on issues of mutual self-interest’, 
and its Executive Director Ralph Perrotta used an op-ed piece in the New York Times to 
THE POLITICS OF WHITE ETHNICITY 
 
15 
 
call for a twin-pronged assault on the problems of poverty and racism and the inclusion 
of working-class ethnic whites in any future liberal or progressive political agenda.29  
Each example adds greater complexity to our understanding of white ethnic 
politics, revealing it to be rather more diverse than previously assumed. Rather than 
pursuing wholly conservative ends, these organizations hint at the rather more complex, 
multifaceted, and often contradictory ideologies and intentions that lay behind white 
ethnic political mobilization in the late 1960s and early 1970s; more ‘New Politics’ than 
New Right. They reveal how white ethnic activists and organizations mobilized to 
confront the urban crisis and the threat of group polarization, seeking to build multiethnic 
coalitions on policy issues of mutual interest to both white and minority groups. 
One such example of grassroots white ethnic mobilization came in Newark, New 
Jersey. Torn apart by rioting in 1967, Newark’s problems were emblematic of the urban 
crisis gripping America’s cities, pitting blacks and ethnic whites against one another in 
grim competition for scarce resources. Seventy five percent of the shrinking white 
population earned less than the average national income, and 13 per cent lived below the 
poverty line; locals bemoaned dilapidated schools, a divisive teachers strike, and violent 
crime.30 In the late 1960s, news coverage focused on tensions (and sporadic violence) in 
the city between black militants and Italian-American councilman and backlash 
demagogue Anthony Imperiale, who talked of a coming race war and whose vigilante 
North Ward Citizens’ Committee patrolled the streets warding off blacks from ethnic 
neighbourhoods.31  
In the late 1960s, a group of Italian-Americans, dissatisfied with the Democratic 
machine of Mayor Hugh Addonizio and concerned about group relations in the city, 
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formed the North Ward Educational and Cultural Center, offering programmes to help 
Italians gain work, college places, and access to anti-poverty programmes, even 
nominating candidates for political office. ‘Blacks have got all these special programs to 
help them get to college… rehabilitate their houses or help them find jobs’, revealed the 
Center’s founder Stephen Adubato. ‘We white ethnics don’t get any of these things. All 
we want is equity.’32 
Yet despite his combative tone, Adubato was no advocate of racial backlash. 
Instead, he built links between the city’s Italian and black communities, reflecting a keen 
political awareness of the changing demographics and power dynamics of American 
cities. In 1970 he supported the candidacy of Kenneth Gibson, Newark’s first black 
mayor, much to the chagrin of Imperiale and his supporters (who labelled Adubato a 
‘nigger-lover’ and accused him of ‘treason’). Critical of a distant, unsympathetic 
liberalism, Adubato nonetheless spoke of his desire to build ‘a new agenda [that] must 
include both groups [Italians and blacks]... a coalition whose objective is to build 
change’, and reflecting the minority status attached to white ethnicity, he explicitly 
analogized Italians to blacks: ‘People confuse us with the white Americans, which we’re 
not. We’re the working-class people who haven’t made it in America, like the blacks, and 
we’re still in the inner city… with them.’ Adubato even described his organization, 
funded by money from the Ford Foundation and Rutgers University, as a ‘white 
NAACP’, servicing what he called ‘the white ethnics... this country’s largest minority 
group’.33 
As with Baroni, Adubato’s words underline forcefully the way in which Black 
Power and the minority rights revolution upended traditional forms of identity, 
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organization, and legitimacy in the political world of the 1970s. In stark contrast to 
previous decades, when Italians’ ‘not quite whiteness’ was a political and cultural 
liability, it was suddenly politically advantageous within this new context to be a 
minority, and identities of racial whiteness lost traction in comparison. 
Adubato may not have featured in as many national newspapers as Imperiale, nor 
provided such a convenient poster boy for the white ethnics-as-backlash narrative, but he 
proved far more adept politically, using a resurgent ethnicity to construct a political base 
in Italian neighbourhoods in the North Ward (distributing Italian flags and decals as 
campaign literature), winning support in both ethnic and black neighbourhoods, and 
building pan-racial political coalitions. In the municipal elections of 1971, over three-
quarters of Adubato’s candidates won posts on the local Democratic Party committee in 
Newark, outmanoeuvring the Addonizio machine, and an Adubato-affiliated candidate 
defeated Imperiale himself to secure a council seat.34 Although his organization struggled 
to stem the exodus of middle-class whites from the city, Adubato broadened the reach of 
the North Ward Center to include non-white residents, many of them Puerto Rican, whilst 
continuing to address the needs of a diverse, multiethnic community. He would prove a 
major player in national white ethnic politics, serving on the board of both the NCUEA 
and Michael Novak’s Ethnic Millions Political Action Committee (EMPAC) and acting 
as a consultant to the Ford Foundation on grants made to white ethnic projects and 
organizations. Whilst Imperiale’s political career fizzled out, an abortive run for mayor of 
Newark in 1974 aside, Adubato was honoured by black, Puerto Rican and Italian-
American organizations for his work, and the North Ward Center lives on to this day.35 
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III 
Once mobilized, the scope of white ethnic political activity during the 1970s was 
impressive. White ethnic organizations secured funding for their objectives from many 
liberal foundations and institutions typically associated with civil rights or anti-poverty 
causes. Prompted by ethnic activists such as Baroni and the American Jewish 
Committee’s Irving Levine, both the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations saw the politics 
of white ethnic difference as a means of weaning ethnic communities away from racial 
backlash whilst also furthering black socio-economic advancement, a cause many 
perceived to have stalled in the 1970s. They subsequently provided six and seven-figure 
grants to projects such as the NCUEA and the AJC’s National Project on Ethnic 
America.36  
Further funding and financial support also came from the Catholic church, where 
leaders, concerned about the precarious state of race relations, acknowledged its ‘critical 
role to play in assisting white ethnic communities to better meet their needs’. The Church 
funded projects in Detroit (the Black-Polish Conference), Cleveland (Project Bridge and 
the Cleveland Ethnic Task Force) and Gary (Goals for Gary), each designed to improve 
group relations, tackle social problems, and train local organizers in racially-changing 
urban communities. Although the grants were small, the initial results were impressive. 
Observers praised the Black-Polish Conference for its success in depolarising the 1969 
mayoral campaign in Detroit, and for defusing group tensions after the shooting of two 
Polish-American policemen outside a black nationalist meeting in the city. Goals for 
Gary was adopted by the city’s first black mayor, Richard Hatcher, to involve the city’s 
ethnic communities in proposals for economic and social development.37 
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Having secured a viable financial base for their activities, white ethnic advocates 
built a sizeable lobbying presence in Washington. Organizations such as the NCUEA and 
EMPAC established offices in Washington; Novak outlining the latter‘s aim ‘to raise 
public awareness… [of] ethnic issues… and to change public policies’. In Congress, Rep. 
Roman Pucinski and Senator Richard Schweiker led a successful bipartisan drive from 
1969-71 to introduce federal legislation supporting ethnic studies programmes. Later, 
Reps. Frank Annunzio and Edward Derwinski led calls in the House for a White House 
Special Assistant for Ethnic Affairs, eventually introduced by Ford in 1975 and 
maintained by Carter.38 Many of these congressional advocates represented ethnic 
constituencies; others with more national ambitions, such as Kennedy, Muskie and 
Charles Percy, recognized the movement’s political potential. Ethnic lobbies in Congress, 
traditionally oriented around the ‘captive nations’ and foreign policy issues, increasingly 
reflected social concerns, whilst attempts were made in the 1970s to form both an Italian-
American and a specifically white ethnic congressional caucus – replicating similar 
organizations for blacks and Hispanics.39  
With these structures in place, white ethnic activists could make an impressive 
impact on both local and national politics. Beginning with the introduction of a national 
Ethnic Heritage Studies Program in 1972, allocating $8.3million of federal funds for 
ethnic studies, public policy increasingly recognized the legitimacy of claims to white 
ethnic entitlement. The Nixon administration pioneered Project Senior Ethnic Find, 
providing translation services, food stamps and other programmes to the low-income 
ethnic elderly, run by the federal volunteer agency ACTION. In Gary, Mayor Hatcher’s 
staff believed the programme could correct perceptions of black entitlement amongst 
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‘Gary’s minority – the white ethnic working people’ – in a now black majority city. By 
the end of 1973, further programmes were proposed for Minneapolis, Milwaukee, and 
New York.40  
Meanwhile, ethnic representatives in Congress and organizations such as the Sons 
of Italy successfully lobbied the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to 
sponsor Italian bilingual education instruction in Brooklyn school districts in 1974. After 
further pressure, Jimmy Carter included Italian-Americans in new federal regulations on 
bilingual education during his presidency.41 White ethnic groups also successfully 
asserted their entitlement to affirmative action programmes in employment and 
education. In 1973, after concerted lobbying from white ethnic advocates in Congress, 
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance published regulations prohibiting 
discrimination against ‘white ethnic minorities’, whom, it acknowledged, ‘continue to be 
excluded from executive, middle-management and other job levels because of 
discrimination based upon their... national origin’. Italian-Americans were designated as 
an affirmative action category at the City University of New York after a campaign by 
Italian-American organizations. And in 1976, the Midwest office of HUD extended 
affirmative action to Poles after research by the Polish-American Congress, supported by 
the NCUEA, revealed that only 10 percent of its employees were Polish, compared to a 
regional population twice that.42 
Finally, the politics of white ethnicity cast an impressive shadow over national 
electoral politics during the 1970s. Traditionally, this impact has been assessed through 
Richard Nixon’s 1972 election campaign, in which he welcomed ethnic voters into his 
Republican ‘New Majority’ through symbolic engagement with ethnic identity politics 
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and divisive appeals to urban whites over issues such as school busing, scatter-site 
housing and racial quotas.43 Yet again, the story is far more complex than that. As 
president Nixon met with Baroni and formulated a package of reforms, the Rosow 
Report, designed to broaden Great Society programmes to working-class Americans. 
Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford, appointed the first ever Special Assistant for Ethnic 
Affairs and hosted a series of White House conferences linking white ethnicity to public 
policy goals. And the Republican Party developed new organizational structures based 
around recognition of white, European ethnicity during the 1970s, using such identities as 
a means of political organization and mobilization designed to broaden the party’s base in 
urban areas.44  
Far from being an exclusively Republican concern, the new ethnic politics was 
also of interest to the Democratic Party in the 1970s. First, leading figures within the 
white ethnic movement, including Baroni, Mikulski and Novak, were Democrats. And 
although challenged by younger, suburban ‘New Democrats’ elected in the landslide of 
1974, many Democratic politicians and strategists saw great potential in the new ethnic 
politics. After controversies over the exclusion of traditional constituent groups from 
party reforms during the 1972 election, the Democrats’ delegate selection committee, 
chaired by Mikulski, successfully finessed the issue of quotas, supporting the goals of the 
black, Hispanic and women’s caucuses whilst reopening the party’s doors to ethnic 
constituents.45 In New York, Lindsay’s Democratic successor as mayor, Abe Beame, 
appointed individual liaisons to the Italian and Polish communities, as well as allocating 
city money for social programmes for marginal ethnic whites in the form of ‘ethnic 
grants’. By mid-decade, the Democratic National Committee had investigated 
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establishing a group to study legislation designed to help ethnic Americans, and had 
invited Novak to testify before the party’s Platform Committee.46 
Baroni’s National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs illuminates the character of 
white ethnic political activism during the decade. Outlining his ‘White Urban Agenda’, 
Baroni cited ethnics’ common cause with racial minorities, their mutual problems of low 
income, educational underachievement and poor housing stock, and the need to counter 
such obstacles – as well as the threat posed by racial demagogues – with social reform. 
‘In too many areas, he concluded, ‘the only people organising are hate-mongers’.47 
Like many white ethnic causes, Baroni found his ideas received a favourable 
hearing at the Ford Foundation. It provided start-up grants to the NCUEA worth over 
$1million during 1970 alone, to initiatives in the areas of ‘White Worker Discontent’ and 
‘The Problems of Ethnic America’, and community projects in Gary, Newark, Baltimore, 
and Detroit. In 1971, it joined the US Catholic Conference and AFL-CIO in helping the 
NCUEA open offices in Washington. Ethnic Americans were ‘alienated… forgotten… 
troubled’, the Foundation acknowledged. The grants would help ‘develop a dialogue 
between the ethnic and black and brown communities… to bring these groups together... 
to find areas of common problems in order to engage in common programming’.48  
After arriving in Washington, Baroni continued to use the NCUEA as a means of 
raising consciousness of white ethnic interests in the nation’s capital. He established an 
academic base at the Catholic University, and built links with national organizations, 
including the National Urban Coalition (with whom it delivered projects of ‘blue-collar 
activities’) and Common Cause.49 The NCUEA attracted many liberal Democrats keen to 
tap into the white ethnic constituency, including Kennedy, Muskie, and George 
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McGovern, who attended NCUEA conferences and lobbied Congress on behalf of white 
ethnic causes.50 And as outlined above, the NCUEA took its cause to the White House, 
Baroni meeting with Nixon in 1970 and Ford in 1976 to discuss the needs of urban ethnic 
communities. 
The NCUEA placed itself at the heart of major liberal concerns of the era. In the 
area of women’s rights, it sponsored the creation of the National Congress of 
Neighborhood Women, whose first conference brought together 150 women from ethnic 
communities to discuss grassroots organization, community activism and issues of 
childcare, housing and education.51 In the area of multiculturalism, Baroni successfully 
lobbied the federal government for the creation of the Bicentennial Ethnic Racial Council 
(BERC), which he chaired, to coordinate minority group participation in the nation’s 
Bicentennial celebrations in 1976. Backed by White House funds, BERC championed 
America’s multiethnic diversity in the Bicentennial themes and programmes it proposed 
– from the Smithsonian‘s ‘Nation of Nations’ exhibit to local street festivals nationwide – 
and it had a lasting impact on ideas of national community. As chairman of Bicentennial 
planning John Warner concluded: ‘We are a nation of nations, proud of the richness and 
diversity of our cultures; the Bicentennial marks the end of any thought of being a 
melting pot.’52 
The centrepiece of the NCUEA’s policy activity was the issue of neighbourhood 
revitalization. Baroni and his team were convinced that if the urban crisis was to be 
averted, ethnically-distinct inner-city neighbourhoods, struggling against white flight, 
disinvestment and destructive urban renewal projects, had to be preserved. Federal urban 
policy had to make this a priority. ‘No one is speaking for the neighbourhoods,’ Baroni 
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wrote in the Washington Post in June 1976, ‘[but] neighbourhoods are the key to the 
problems of the city. If the neighbourhoods die, the cities die.’ But Baroni’s embrace of 
the neighbourhood did not equate to blind resistance to racial integration. Instead, the 
NCUEA supported programmes to train a new cadre of progressive neighbourhood 
leaders and organizers, provided funding for local credit unions and fledgling 
neighbourhood development corporations, developed neighbourhood revitalization 
projects and actively combated redlining through involvement in the authorship of the 
1977 Community Reinvestment Act. Democratic politicians ranging from Mayors Kevin 
White (Boston) and Kenneth Gibson (Newark) to Senators Muskie and William Proxmire 
endorsed NCUEA programmes aimed at neighbourhood revitalization, and asked for 
their constituencies to be considered as demonstration cities. And although Baroni 
supported the right of neighbourhoods to retain their ethnic distinctiveness, the 
neighbourhood movement was palpably multiracial, as blacks and whites united around 
the threat posed to inner-city communities. In 1976 the New York Times praised 
neighbourhood organizations backed by the NCUEA, such as Baltimore’s SECO and 
Gary’s CCC, as ‘perhaps the most thoroughly integrated protest since the early civil 
rights days’.53 
The NCUEA made its urban policy breakthrough in 1976, with a White House 
conference on ethnicity and neighbourhood revitalization, overseen by President Ford 
and his new Special Assistant for Ethnic Affairs, Myron Kuropas. The conference, 
bringing together activists, politicians and representatives from the White House and 
federal departments, broke new ground in its emphasis on the fundamental difference of 
white ethnics and their entitlement to separate consideration in public policy. ‘This day,’ 
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Baroni declared, ‘will provide the impetus for promoting the special programmes so 
important to ethnic America.’54 But it was also successful in building a multiethnic 
coalition behind neighbourhood revitalization, including representatives from black and 
Hispanic communities, and stressed unity and togetherness, even a collective vision of 
national identity, through the recognition of group difference and multiculturalism. As 
Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson told participants, reflecting an evolving vision 
of Americanism as cultural pluralism, ‘It is time now for us to forge a strategy based on 
coalition between diverse groups recognising each other’s right in a pluralistic society to 
build a sense of community and ethnic pride.’ Such optimism was further fuelled by 
Ford’s creation of a Presidential Committee on Urban Development and Neighborhood 
Revitalization, the award of a two-year, $474,000 HUD grant to the NCUEA to study 
neighbourhood development in major cities, and the primacy of issues of ethnicity and 
neighbourhood during the 1976 election, in which both candidates grappled to 
demonstrate their commitment to ethnic pluralism and the white ethnic agenda.55 
 
IV 
The politics of white ethnicity continued to wield considerable influence over President 
Jimmy Carter’s Democratic administration towards the end of the 1970s, further evidence 
of its appeal to liberals and progressives, as well as conservatives, in a period of political 
flux. Against the backdrop of partisan ‘dealignment’ and weakened political institutions, 
Democrats also recognized the power of white ethnic assertion and the evident need to 
engage with it. Thus despite his pious eschewal, even denunciation, of interest group 
politics early in his administration, Carter recognized the potency of appeals to white 
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ethnic identity politics, harnessing it to his attempts to return ethnic voters to the 
Democratic Party and rebuild a divided Democratic coalition. Designing a White House 
network of special representatives working with ethnic constituency groups, Carter 
continued and even expanded the institutionalization of ethnic group difference in 
government under Nixon and Ford, reinvigorating an older politics of ethnic pluralism 
upon which the old Democratic coalition had been based.56  
Carter’s new Office of Ethnic Affairs, catering to the needs of white, European 
ethnics and replicating similar mechanisms for racial minorities, was headed by the 
Italian-American Stephen Aiello. A former president of the New York City Board of 
Education, Aiello was convinced of the need to develop multiethnic coalitions, cutting 
across group lines, to build support for public policy. As board president, Aiello’s 
successes included the development of a multicultural bilingual education programme in 
the city, offered to both minority and white ethnic groups, and his goals and rhetoric 
reflected the wider national trend towards cultural pluralism. ‘We are all ethnics in the 
United States,’ he declared in 1980. ‘Americans live in a pluralistic society. It is essential 
to develop a public policy that reflects this pluralism.’57 Such words would form part of 
an ‘ethnic plank’ in the Democratic Party platform for the 1980 presidential election 
campaign, which, underlining the progressive, multiculturalist tone of much of Carter’s 
engagement with white ethnicity, reified America as ‘a beautiful mosaic’ and pledged to 
‘foster the concept of pluralism’ in national politics and society.58 
Indeed, whereas Richard Nixon had typically used white ethnic identity politics 
almost as a divisive wedge, designed to detach ethnic voters from the Democratic 
coalition, Carter’s aides saw the accentuation of ethnic pluralism as a means of reducing 
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the group polarization that had proved so detrimental to the Democratic Party over the 
previous decade. Recognising white ethnic entitlement to federal programmes and policy, 
they believed, would enable the administration to rebuild a fractured Democratic 
organization, reduce conflict over contested liberal programmes and correct a wider 
public perception of such initiatives as in thrall to organized interests. ‘Our desire’, Aiello 
stated, ‘is to make the general society aware and responsive to the legitimate needs and 
aspirations of all ethnic groups… and not turn one group against the other.’59   
Thus Carter, declaring his ‘need to address the problems of the ethnic poor’ at a 
1977 public policy forum, embraced the neighbourhood revitalization agenda 
championed by the NCUEA. Besides appointing Baroni as Assistant Secretary for 
Neighborhoods at HUD, his administration created a National Commission on 
Neighborhoods, staffed by activists and organizers from white ethnic and minority group 
communities, as part of its 1978 urban policy proposals, and granted $25million per year 
to neighbourhood organizations.60 His administration encouraged the executive branch to 
include white ethnic groups in affirmative action regulations, whilst federal agencies 
were encouraged to explore shifting the definition of ‘minority’ from a racial term to a 
broader one reflecting socio-economic disadvantage. Aiello even investigated the 
possibility of a White House affirmative action policy specifically for ethnics.61 The 
administration also recommended that the definition of ‘national origin’ in Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act be extended to include ethnic Americans, and sponsored a 
consultation on the ‘Civil Rights Issues of Euro-Ethnic Americans in the United States’ 
in December 1979, which ensured the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
issued new guidelines for discrimination based on national origin. Aiello later described 
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the consultation as ‘a first step… [making] Euro-ethnics feel that they are also part of 
what’s happening with blacks and Hispanics and others when it comes to 
discrimination’.62 
However, Carter was engaging with a failing white ethnic politics, rapidly 
overwhelmed by a transformed political and socio-economic environment which by 1980 
favoured a broader rightward shift in national politics. Such a swing proved fatal to the 
liberal aspects of white ethnicity. Carter’s embrace of ethnic identity politics contradicted 
his own political rhetoric, exacerbated group tensions within a disintegrating Democratic 
coalition, and was identified by the public with an unpopular interest group liberalism 
and perceived sense of national fragmentation at the end of the 1970s. The politics of 
white ethnicity’s failure to transcend those fears ensured it became regarded as a 
symptom of, rather than an antidote to, this crisis. Identity politics, only a few years 
earlier recognized as a political necessity for ethnic groups, with the black civil rights 
movement as its moral and political exemplar, was now regarded as a pejorative epithet, a 
byword for selfishness, division and fragmentation. Ethnic newspapers such as the Greek 
language Ethnikon, previously enthusiastic converts to white ethnic identity politics, now 
called on political leaders ‘to restore the unity of America’. And in the Carter White 
House, Aiello found himself responding to letters, many from ethnic Americans, 
condemning the creation of an Office of Ethnic Affairs for cultivating divisiveness and 
polarization.63 Transcending these divisions through a renewed universalist language that 
harked back to the post-war era of ethnic assimilation, Republican Ronald Reagan was 
able to appeal more effectively to ethnic voters concerned about non-ethnic, middle class 
issues such as inflation, taxes and declining national prestige. 
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Likewise, tightening economic constraints, notably the runaway inflation of the 
1979-80, rendered large federal outlays on liberal programmes specifically for ethnics 
unlikely (although they had rarely ever risen above tokenism) and diminished many non-
governmental sources of funding. The neighbourhood revitalization agenda Baroni was 
appointed to deliver was one such victim of this new fiscal austerity, swallowed up, along 
with the administration’s wider urban policy proposals, by Carter’s fiscal conservatism.64 
Such constraints also reasserted identities of class amongst ethnics, breeding a new 
middle-class consciousness of conservative bent that viewed liberal government as 
inimical to their own interests, railed against ‘handouts’ and ‘giveaway programmes’ and 
rendered support for a politics of compensatory justice and ethnic identity increasingly 
untenable.65 Indeed, ongoing socio-economic trends, underlined by the 1980 US Census, 
revealed that the minority rights agenda propagated by liberal ethnic activists targeted an 
ethnic community that was increasingly middle-class, suburban, and difficult to locate.66 
Despite the economic insecurities of the late 1970s, the increasingly assimilated, 
upwardly mobile majority took little sustenance from a white ethnic agenda of minority 
group entitlement and recognition that sought redress for grievances the majority of them 
barely felt and pursued rights and programmes they pejoratively associated with 
minorities and the poor. Sociologist Andrew Greeley, an early advocate for the white 
ethnics, affirmed that compared to blacks or Hispanics, ‘the pain was [not] enough to 
create a genuine social movement’ for ethnics.67 
Finally, white ethnic politics was never able to overcome its own institutional 
shortcomings. Despite the feverish attention it received, the white ethnic movement, as 
such, was never a grassroots phenomenon. Outside of Washington, few ethnic Americans 
JOE MERTON 
identified themselves as underprivileged white ethnics; few of them, when interviewed by 
sociologists, had even heard of the new politics of white ethnicity. Attempts at 
multiethnic political mobilization and engagement were not always successful, and 
traditionally powerful and well-resourced individual ethnic groups, notably Italian-
Americans, continued to dominate the agenda, often championing individual national 
group concerns over interethnic ones. Indeed, the diversity of white ethnic interests was 
more a weakness than a strength, inhibiting group unity and cohesion. Instead, ‘white 
ethnic’ was primarily a label appropriated on these groups’ behalf either by the activists 
and intellectuals who promoted it, or the politicians who glimpsed its potential. In truth, 
Baroni and his contemporaries remained leaders without followers. ‘There was an awful 
lot of smoke and mirrors about the ethnic movement’, Greeley ruefully concluded. ‘It 
was not much ado about nothing, but some ado about practically nothing.’68  
 
V 
The politics of white ethnicity was rather more complex and diverse than is traditionally 
outlined by historians. The inclination to present them as racist reactionaries or 
obstructionists accentuates the most visceral expressions of political ethnicity, at the 
expense of the work of activists such as Mikulski, Baroni, or Adubato in developing a 
more temperate, substantive white ethnic politics. It overlooks the role played by the 
recognition of white ethnic difference in building coalitions over neighbourhood 
revitalization, the Bicentennial celebrations or Project Senior Ethnic Find, and its 
attentiveness to the pressing social needs of many urban ethnic communities. It was by no 
means, to quote two recent historians on the subject, solely an ‘atavistic cultural 
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populism’ targeted at racial resentments, but in many cases sought to actively counter 
such sentiments after the tumult of the 1960s.69  
Equally, rather than directly encouraging a conservative shift during the 1970s 
amongst ethnic Americans, white ethnicity in fact held potential for both conservatives 
and liberals, reflecting a decade defined by political flux, in which conventional 
categories of left and right, liberal and conservative, did not always hold fast. White 
ethnic politics was a heterogeneous impulse with a diverse range of objectives and 
concerns, and in different ways, both right and left called on it to construct political 
coalitions. Likewise, at the grassroots, white ethnicity was not only represented by angry 
exponents of racial backlash but also campaigners for social reform. Thus white ethnicity 
was more than a staging post in the conservative resurgence of the late twentieth century, 
but a powerful manifestation of an era of political void, even drift. 
So why the distortion? One reason for this oversight may be the problems 
engendered by a top-down, executive-led approach. By focusing on the divisive 
strategising of a president such as Nixon, who tended – at least after his first year in 
office – to theorize the white ethnics as angry backlashers, appealed to through coarse 
appeals to social grievances, historians have left us with a warped image of the white 
ethnic constituency. For Nixon, ethnic communities’ defence of their neighbourhoods 
equated to assaults on racially redistributive policies such as school busing and open 
housing; an interpretation historians have largely bought into. At the grassroots, where 
neighbourhood activism carried a very different definition to Nixon’s, there was a 
remarkably different picture.  
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Another reason may be the fact that the examples of white ethnic political activity 
discussed above, from successful applications for Ford Foundation monies to the 
lobbying of politicians, were simply not as viscerally exciting as Irish and Italian-
American anti-busing protesters in Boston, nor Anthony Imperiale’s vigilantes in 
Newark. Nevertheless, they were as real, substantive, and important, if not more so, and 
possessed great influence on national politics during the 1970s. The white ethnics knew 
they had to follow the template laid out by racial minorities during the 1960s. 
The distortion may also lie in scholars’ tendency to look for linear patterns in the 
volatile political environment of the 1970s. Certainly, scholars are correct to identify 
ethnic voters’ traditional allegiance to the Democrats as losing its vitality during this 
period; election returns reveal as much.70 And there is much evidence to suggest that 
there was a broader rightward shift abroad in the nation by 1980. However, whether the 
white ethnic politics of the 1970s fits into this narrative of conservative renaissance is 
debatable. Many non-ethnic factors influenced ethnic political behaviour, from the 
economy to the changing composition of the political parties. Identities of class, race, and 
religion often transcended those of ethnicity or national origin at the polls. The white 
ethnic agenda reflected many of these constituent factors, identities, and concerns, each 
huddled under the ‘white ethnic’ umbrella. And the goals and politics practiced by ethnic 
activists during the 1970s had little in common with the substance and rhetoric of the 
Reagan revolution; instead they seem to step from another era. 
This article has sought to reshape both our understanding of the politics of white 
ethnicity and, more generally, the political character of 1970s America. By providing a 
broader and fuller portrait of the nature of white ethnic political activism, focusing on the 
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grassroots as well as the executive, the failure of white ethnic identity politics as well as 
its emergence, we can see that in many ways, the 1970s were not the conservative 1970s, 
but a period of considerable uncertainty and sudden transition. This does not make the 
decade a time of political disengagement and inactivity; a time when ‘it seemed like 
nothing happened’.71 Instead, the 1970s were a period of great political experimentation 
and volatility, in which traditional political and cultural norms, values, and institutions 
were weakened or challenged. Political alternatives such as the white ethnics took 
succour from the staggering impact of the black civil rights revolution and the 
surprisingly persistent legacy of the 1960s on the political world of the 1970s, whilst 
responding to the transformative environment of the new era. Even if they were 
eventually unsuccessful, their attempts to develop a viable post-liberal, yet not 
conservative, politics are important. Therefore, perhaps we should rethink what we know 
not only about the politics of white ethnicity, but also the 1970s. 
The largely untold stories of white ethnic political activism outlined above further 
underline the point. They reveal how political actors of all backgrounds, unable to divine 
the trajectory of their times during the 1970s, sought to engage with the new ethnic 
politics, and utilize it for their own, often divergent, ends. These actors, scrambling for 
new ideas in the absence of a prevailing post-liberal wisdom, keen to build new coalitions 
and seduced by white ethnicity’s protean meanings, assigned it great agency and potential 
power. And once drawn to white ethnicity, they often imposed their own, competing 
notions and meanings of white ethnicity upon the label itself. Therefore, white ethnics 
could be conservatives, as theorized by Richard Nixon, but they could also be liberals and 
progressives, actively combating racial backlash.  
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Such heterogeneity reflects the shortcomings of the existing tendency to portray 
the white ethnics as an element in the conservative counterrevolution of the late twentieth 
century. Instead, the politics of white ethnicity was a powerful manifestation of a decade 
of political vacuum; a transitional or ‘bridge’ period defined by the abrupt end to the 
certainties of the liberal consensus, but not yet ready to embrace conservatism; a time 
when the nation stood rather awkwardly between the rigid post-war ideals of ethnic 
assimilation and the present-day reality of fluid, self-prescribed ethnic affiliations for 
European ethnic whites. An appreciation of this point gives us a broader, more 
representative understanding of white ethnic politics, emphasising its essential ambiguity, 
malleability and consequent appeal to groups from across the political spectrum. It 
highlights white ethnicity’s significance in the wider reformation of American politics 
that took place after the achievements of the civil rights revolution. It underscores the 
shortcomings of the white ethnic assertion of the 1970s for our understanding of the rise 
of conservatism. Finally, it might also enable us to come to a more accurate, if decidedly 
less linear and straightforward, portrait of the 1970s, underlining the volatile, complex 
character of this chapter in American history and its significance for the formation of 
ethnic identities in today’s ‘post-ethnic’ United States.72 
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